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GRACE V. WHITAKER: ADVANCING REFUGEE RIGHTS 
BEYOND THE CREDIBLE FEAR INTERVIEW 
BY ELISA VARI AND RICHARD A. BOSWELL 
◄ 
In December 2018, federal judge Emmett Sullivan 
of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
issued a decision with great significance for asylum-
seekers at the credible fear interview stage and, as 
argued in this paper, in asylum proceedings generally. 
While the case, Grace v. Whitaker, is currently on 
appeal, its mandate has not been stayed, and both the 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") 
and the Executive Office for Immigration Review 
("EOIR") have issued revised guidelines to officers 
and immigration judges on how the decision is to be 
implemented.1 In Grace, Judge Sullivan,reviewed the 
far-reaching case of Matter of A-B-, which had been 
decided by Attorney General Sessions in June 2018, 
as well as the USCIS Policy Memorandum issued the 
following month instructing officers on its implement at 
the credible fear interview ("CFI") stage.2 
With Matter of A-8-, Sessions sought to curtail 
protections for asylum-seekers fleeing their country 
due to domestic or gang-based violence by overruling 
Matter of A-R-C-G-, which recognized gender-based 
violence as a valid ground for persecution, and by 
essentially reinterpreting U.S. asylum law in a way that, 
1 Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96 (D.D.C. 2018); 
Grace v. Whitaker - EOIR Guidance re Grace Injunction, 
December 19, 2018, https://www,aclu.org/lcgal-documcnt/ 
grace-v-whitakcr-eoir-guidance-re-grace-injunction, https:// 
pcnna.cdC5B9-R272; Grace v. Whitaker - USCIS Guidance 
Re Grace Injunction, December 19, 2018, https:l/www. 
aclu.org/legal-document/gracc-v-whitakcr-uscis-guidance-re-
gracc>injunction, https://~cc/LMK6-86GA 
2 Matter of A-B·, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 320 (2018); see 
also Center for Gender and Refugee Srudies, CGRS Practice 
Advisory: Matter of A-B-(July 6, 2018); U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services, Policy Memorandum PM-602-0162: 
Guidance for Processing Reasonable Fear, Credible Fear, 
Asylum, and Refugee Claims in Accordance with Matter of 
A-8- [hereinafter "USCIS Policy Memo") (July 11, 2018), 
available at https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USClS/ 
Laws/Memoranda/2018/2018-06-18-PM-602-0162-USCIS-
Mcmorandum-Mattcr-of-A-B.pdf, https://pcrma.cc/8ZDH-
8X55; 23 Bender's lmmigr. Bull. 872 (App. E)(Aug. 1, 2018). 
as Judge Sullivan wrote, is inconsistent with existing 
precedents and Congress' intent in passing the 1980 
Refugee Act.3 
This paper will briefly discuss the significance of 
Matter of A-8- and the resulting USCIS memorandum . 
It will then explain Grace v. Whitaker and how the 
decision is of great importance not only for credible 
fear ("CF") proceedings, but also for asylum applica-
tions in general, as the language used by Judge Sullivan, 
while not binding in other contexts, can still be relied on 
by practitioners as persuasive authority. 
Background on Matter of A-B-
in the summer of 2018, Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions used his "certification" powers and assumed 
' the role of decision maker in Matter of A-B-, thus exer-
cising a power that is not commonly uscd.4 When the 
decision was first issued in June, many advocates saw it 
as severely limiting protections for survivors of 
"private" violence, making it virtually impossible for 
those fleeing domestic abuse or gangs to succeed in 
their claims for asylum.5 
In his decision, Sessions reversed Matter of A-R-C-
G-, sharply criticizing the Board of Immigration 
Appeals' ("BIA") failure to engage in a meaningful 
3 344 F. Supp. 3d at 126; see also Matter of A-R-C-G-, 
26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (BIA 2014). 
4 8 CF.R. § 1003.l(h)(J);seea/so Press Release, Center for 
Gender and Refugee Studies, CGRS Files Suit Seeking Infonna-




s Jeff Sessions is Hijacking Immigration Law, Slate.com 
(June 13, 2018), https://slate.com/ncws-and-politics/2018/ 
06/in-matter-of-a-b-jeff-sessions-hijacked-immigration-law-
by-abusing-a-rarely-used-provision.html, https://perma.cc/ 
9AKB-SDA4; Sessions Says Domestic and Gang Violence 
Are Nol Grounds for A.l)'lum, NY Times (J unc 11, 2018), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2018/06/11/us/politics/sessions-domcstic-
violence-asylum.html, https:l/pcnna.cc/52LV-3DTZ. 
analysis of the case before it.6 Specifically, in A-R-C-G-
thc BJA had recognized "married women in Guatemala 
who are unable to leave their relationship" as a parti-
cular social group ("PSG") by giving, according to 
Sessions, "insufficient deference to the factual findings 
of the immigration judge. " 7 Sessions reiterated the 
general requirements to establish cognizability of and 
membership in a PSG, namely immutability, particu-
larity, and socinl distinction, but then outlined blanket 
rules ns to how these are to be satisfied when the perse-
cutor is a private actor.8 
Sessions' statement that "in practice [claims based 
on violence inflicted by private actors] are unlikely to 
satisfy the statutory grounds for proving group persecu-
tion that the government is unable or unwilling to 
address" was particularly problematic.9 The Attorney 
Gcncml, in fact, seemed to assume that if persecution 
is not inflicted by a governmental body or individual 
connected to the state, rarely could it count as persecu-
tion, even though, as Grace discusses and as explained 
infra, numerous judicial precedents support the cogniz-
ability of PSGs when the government is not involved. 
Sessions stressed that, when the government is not the 
persecutor, the applicant must show that the govern-
ment "condorted" the persecution or demonstrated a 
"complete helplessness" in providing protection. 10 
This was criticized as a distortion of and higher standard 
thnn the ordinarily applied "unable or unwilling to 
protect" standard.11 
Another problematic element of the decision was 
Sessions' take on the "one central reason" standard 
for the nexus requirement of asylum applications. In 
6 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 320. 
7 26 I. & N. Dec. at 389; Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 
at 320. 
~ Mauer of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 320. 
9 Id. at 320. 
w Id. at 337 (quoting Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955,958 
(7th Cir. 2000)). 
11 Immigrant Legal Resoun:e Center, Matter of A-B-
Conslderalians 4, https://www .ilrc.org/sitcs/default/files/ 
rcsources/matter_a_b_considerations-20180927 .pdf [ MILRC 
Practice Advisory"], https://perma.cc/9BEM-NCR3; American 
Immigration Lawyers Association, AILA Policy Brief USCIS 
Guidance on Matter of A-B-Blocks Pl'Oteclionsfor Vulnerable 
Asylum Seekers and Refagees (July 23, 2018), https://www. 
ai\a.org/Filc/DownloadEmbeddedFile/76742, https://perma. 
cc/3XDW-H66K; Exclusive: how asylum officers are being 
told 111 impleme11t Sessions' new rules, Vo,c.com (June 19, 
20 I 8 ), https://www.vo,c.com/poticy-and-politics/2018/6/19/ 
l 7 4 76662/asylum-border-sessions, https:/ /perma.cc/X 86X-
NK2G. 
fact, Sessions seemed to suggest that just because the 
persecuting private actor has a pre-existing relationship 
with the asylum-seeker, as is clearly the case with 
domestic-violence based claims, an applicant for 
asylum cannot prove that membership in a particular 
social group constitutes "one central reason" for perse-
cution, because the persecutor would have ulterior 
motives to hann her.12 
Further, Matter of A-B- stressed the importance of 
avoiding circular PSGs, that is PSGs defined by the 
harm inflicted on the applicant. As Sessions explained, 
the PSG articulated by Ms. A-B-, "El Salvadoran 
women who arc unable to leave their domestic relation-
ships where they have children in common," was 
impennissibly circular because it relied on the "unable 
to leave" element 13 That element, according to Sessions, 
is part of the persecution inflicted on the member and 
makes the PSG dependent on the hann and therefore not 
cognizable. 14 
Lastly, and more problematically, Sessions pro-
vided a series of additional requirements throughout 
the decision, stating, for example, that all PS Gs the 
applicant is relying on need to be delineated at the 
inception of the case and may not be added on appeal; 
he also stated that when only a few individuals are 
persecuting the applicant, relocation is likely more 
reasonable.15 Sessions also stressed that, in exercising 
discretion, adjudicators should take into consideration, 
inter alia, whether the applicant engaged in the "circum-
vention of orderly refugee procedures." 16 Finally, the 
Attorney General stated that an adverse credibility 
finding may result even when there are only a few discre-
pancies and omissions in the applicant's claim.17 
Sessions' sweeping statements on Matter of A-B-, 
however, were, as discussed below, soon challenged, 
and advocates indicated that, in any case, much of 
what was in the decision should be treated as dictum 
since for the most part it discussed hypothetical scenarios 
rather than Ms. A-B-'s specific case.'8 
12 Mauer of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 338-39. 
13 Id. at 343. 
14 Id. at 334-36 
15 Id. at 344-45; see also ILRC Practice Advisory, supra 
note 11. 
16 Matter of A-B-. 271. & N. Dec. at 345 n.12. 
11 Id. at 342. 
18 ILRC Practice Advisory, supra note 11, at 3. 
USCIS Policy Memo of July 2018 
Despite the disputed value of Sessions' ruling, 
USCIS rapidly issued a policy memorandum in July 
2018 directing its officers on the implementation of 
the decision in the context of CFis and reasonable 
fear interviews at the expedited removal stage. 19 
The memo instructed officers to adopt the standards 
outlined in Matter of A-B- and to abandon reliance on 
Matter of A-R-C-G-. It also directed the application 
of a "condoned or demonstrated complete helpless-
ness" standard for nongovemment pcrsccution. 20 
Specifically, it explained that showing that a country 
has issues in addressing crime "cannot, by itself, estab-
lish eligibility for asylum. " 21 
The Policy Memo also suggested, in accordance 
with Matter of A-B-, that tenns such as "'married,' 
'women,' and 'unable to leave the relationship' are 
unlikely to be sufficiently particular" for purposes of 
establishing a PSG.22 USCIS explained to its officers 
that when the applicant is vulnerable to generalized 
crime, groups based on such vulnerability "are not a 
subdivision of the society, but instead arc typical of the 
society as a whole. "23 It concluded, therefore, that 
members of groups victimized by private activity will 
likely fail to meet the particularity required to establish 
a cognizable PSG. 
USCIS then discussed the requirement that a PSG 
is defined independently from the harm asserted1by the 
applicant. Relying heavily on Sessions' language, 
USCIS instructed its officers that a group such as 
"married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave 
their relationship" is impennissibly circular because the 
applicant's inability to leave is created by the hann 
alleged.24 
USCIS also took Matter of A-B- and fully adopted 
its view that, generally, "claims based on membership 
in a putative particular social group defined by the 
members' vulnerability to harm of domestic violence 
or gang violence committed by non-government 
19 See users Policy Memo, supra note 2. 
20 Users Policy Memo, supra note 2, at 2. 
21 Id. at 6. 
22 Id. at 3. 
23 Id. at 4 (relying on Maller of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 
at 335). 
24 Id. at 5. 
actors will not establish the basis for asylum. " 25 It 
also reiterated Sessions' assumptions that, if there is a 
pre-existing relationship between the persecutor and the 
applicant, then the applicant's membership in a PSG will 
often fail to meet the "one central reason" slandard for 
nexus, and that internal relocation is likely more reason-
able where the persecutor is not the govemment.26 
Finally, the Policy Memo instructed USCIS agents 
to weigh an applicant's illegal entry as a ground for 
a negative exercise of discretion, or if the applicant 
"demonstrated ulterior motives for the illegal entry 
that arc inconsistent with a valid asylum claim that 
the applicant wished to present to U.S. authorities." 27 
Both the USCIS Memo and Matter of A-B-, 
however, were largely conscribed by the Grace deci-
sion discussed below. 
Grace v. Wl,itaker 
In August 20 I 8, the American Civil Liberties Union 
and the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies at the 
University of California, Hastings challenged the 
validity of Sessions' decision and the resulting USCIS 
Policy Memo in the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Columbia on behalf of twelve nam~d plaintiffs.2s 
The plaintiffs, who had received a negative credible 
fear interviews and were ordered removed, alleged, 
inter alia, that Matter of A-B- and the USCIS Policy 
Memo impermissibly heightened and distorted the rela-
tively low standards that are typical of CFls . For the 
most part, Judge Sullivan agreed with the plaintiffs' 
main argument and issued an order, narrowing the 
Altorney General's decision and signaling to the admin-
istration that the powers of the Attorney General to 
change the law are not unfettered. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint 
The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive 
relief to prevent implementat~on of aspects of both 
2
' Id. at 6. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 8. 
28 Because the case involved a challenge to the applica-
tion of expedited removal the statute limits review to an action 
filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 
the only court that can entertain jurisdiction over "a systemic 
challenge to the legality of a 'written policy directive, written 
policy directive guideline, or written procedure issued by or 
under the authority of the Attorney General to implement' the 
expedited removal process." Grace v. Whitaker, 344 f . Supp. 
at 108; see 8 U.S.C. §1252(e)(3)(A). 
the Attorney General's decision in Matter of A-B- and 
the resulting USCIS Policy Memo written in July 2018. 
They argued that the decision as well as the Memo 
effectively toughened the CFI process, even though 
Congress intended for such proceedings to entail a 
lower standard, that is "a possibility ... that the alien 
could establish eligibility for asylum. "29 
First, the decision and Memo allegedly had made 
blanket-rule statements creating an "unlawful presump-
tion" against the cognizability of PSGs based on private 
persccution.30 This, the plaintiffs argued, violated the 
requirement that asylum claims be analyzed case by 
case and was a departure from existing precedents and 
prior policy. Second, they allegedly changed the stan-
dards for asylum by requiring that applicants show that 
the foreign government "condoned or demonstrated 
complete helplessness" and by making the nexus stan-
dard more diffitult to meet for members of PSGs. The 
"condoned or demonstrated complete helplessness" 
standard, the plaintiffs argued, is inconsistent with the 
text and context of the Refugee Act and Congress' 
intent to confonn to international nonns. Furthennore, 
precedents provide that an applicant can meet the 
"unable or unwilling" standard even when she cannot 
show that her government condoned persecution or was 
helpless to provide protection against nongovernmental 
persccuton;. 31 
In challenging Matter of A-B- 's nexus requirement, 
the plaintiffs argued that the INA provides that a perse-
cutor could have mixed motives in inflicting harm on 
the applicant, and thus a preexisting relationship should 
not defeat a claim. Moreover, they maintained that 
Sessions' finding that including "unable to leave" in 
the PSG fonnulation renders the group dependent on 
the harm alleged and thus makes it impermissibly 
circular was mistaken. Inability to leave is in fact the 
result of several factors aside from the harm, including 
cultural and societal norms that the persecutor may 
believe in and circumstances that affect applicants in 
their own countries and make women subordinate to 
men in the eyes of society. 32 
In addition, the directives imposed by Matter of 
A-B- and the USCIS Policy Memo required applicants 
to articulate PSGs at the credible fear stage, a require-
ment the plaintiffs alleged was wholly unreasonable, 
J'J Pis.' Compl. ,r 4 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(bXl)(B)(v)). 
30 Id. at ,r 55. 
·" Id. at ~- 58. 
32 lei. at , . 60. 
unprecedented, and unlawful. "[D]efining and estab-
lishing membership in a particular social group is one 
of the most complex and difficult questions in asylum 
law," the plaintiffs argued, and it cannot be expected 
that applicants will be able to articulate such a nuanced 
aspect of their claim as soon as they arrive at the border, 
especially at a "truncated, nonadversarial" stage such 
as that of the CFI. 33 
In altering and toughening requirements for asylum 
seekers fleeing domestic abuse and gang-based violence, 
in short, the plaintiffs contended that Matter of A-B- and 
the USCIS Policy Memo put protections for asylum 
seekers in general at serious risk and deprived the 
plaintiffs and those similarly situated of meaningful 
avenues to seek protection even if their asylwn claims 
were meritorious. 34 
The Decision 
The district court found that the policies introduced 
by .Matter of A-B- and USCIS' Policy Memo deviated 
from prior policies and were therefore an arbitrary and 
capricious interpretation of the law such that they 
violated the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") 
and the INA.35 The court held that while "Congress 
has not spoken directly on the precise question of 
whether victims of domestic or gang-related persecu-
tion fall into the particular social group category ... the 
legislative history [of the 1980 Refugee Act] does make 
clear that Congress intended to bring United States 
refugee law into confonnance with the [Protocol]. "36 
Specifically, the court stressed that the 1980 Refugee 
Act was enacted in accordance with the "historic policy 
(?f the United States to respond to the urgent needs of 
persons subject to persecution in their homelands [and] 
it is the policy of the United States to encourage all 
nations to provide assistance and resettlement opportu-
nities to refugees to the fullest extent possible. "' 37 
Therefore, even though ultimately the court found the 
statute to be ambiguous, it stressed the importance of 
looking not only at the Protocol but also al the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Refugees' ("UNHCR") Hand-
book, which "codified the United Nations' interpretation 
33 Id. at ,r 62. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
34 Id. at 1/ 80-83. 
35 Grace, 344 F. Supp. 3d at 120. 
36 Id. at 123-24 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
37 Id. at 124 ( citing Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F .3d 961, 
983 (9th Cir. 2006) (O'Scannlain, J. concurring in part and 
citing Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96--212, 94 Stat 102)), 
- - - --- --- ---
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of the tenn 'particular social group' . . . construing the 
tenn expansively. "38 
The district court concluded that Matter of A-B-
was not "the product of reasoned decisionmaking" 
and its blanket-rule statements were arbitracy and capri-
cious interpretations of the INA, because they are 
contrary to precedent and at odds with Congress' 
intent to make the CFI screening a tower standard.39 
Specifically, the court held that "[a] general rule that 
effectively bars the claims based on certain categories 
of persecutors (i.e. domestic abusers or gang members) 
or claims related to certain kinds of violence is incon-
sistent with Congress' intent to bring United States 
refugee law into conformance with the [P]rolocol. " 40 
The court concluded that, because the Attorney General 
had interpreted "PSG" in a way that resulted in a general 
and overbroad rule, he was operating outside of a permis-
sible interpretation of the law. The Attorney General's 
statement that gang-based violence could rarely, if ever, 
be cognizable directly conflicted with Congress' in~ent 
as well as the BIA's and circuit precedents indicating 
that the cognizability of a PSG is to be determined 
case by case.41 
Further, the court agreed with the plaintiffs that 
Matter of A-B- "impermissibly heightened the standard 
at the credible fear stage. " 42 The provisions of the INA 
relative to CFI proceedings, in fact, point to Congress' 
intent that such proceedings be nonadversarial and 
require only that the applicant show a significant possi-
bility (a one in ten chance) ofpersccution. 43 That means 
that a CFI requires only a fraction of what a full asylum 
screening usually requires. Because Sessions' overbroad 
statements were "neither adequately explained nor 
38 Id. nt 124. 
39 Id. at 125. 
40 Id. at 126 (internal quotations omitted). 
41 MatterofM-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227,251 (BlA 
2014); Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 21 l, 233 (BlA 
1985); see also Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077, 1084 
(9th Cir. 2014) ("To detennine whcthcrn group is a particular 
social group for the purposes of an asylum claim, the agency 
must make a case-by-case dctennin ation as to whether the 
group is recognized by the particular society in question."); 
Serrano-Alberto v. Att'y Gen., 859 F.3d 208, 212 n.2 (3d Cir. 
2017) (same); Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 
2016) (same); Paiz-Morales v. Lynch, 795 F.3d 238, 245 (1st 
Cir . 2015) (same) . 
42 344 F, Supp . 3d at 126. 
43 Id. at 127. 
supported by agency precedent," the court concluded 
that they violated immigration law.44 
Judge Sullivan then held that the government's 
interpretation of persecution was inconsistent with 
lhc statute. 4s Specifically, the standard imposed -
that an applicant show that the government condoned 
or displayed complete helplessness - is a much more 
stringent standard than the "unwilling or unable" 
one and would mean that "no asylum applicant who 
received assistance from the government, regardless 
of how ineffective that assistance was, could meet the 
persecution requirement when the persecutor is a non-
government actor." 46 Accordingly, the government's 
interpretation of the term "persecution" to require that 
a foreign government condoned the violence or was 
completely helpless in providing protection to an appli-
cant was erroneous. 
As to nexus, the court agreed with the government 
that its interpretation of the nexus requirement was 
reasonable.47 According to the court, the government 
relied on the "one central reason" standard and merely 
stated that hann based on purely personal disputes will 
not satisfy the nexus requirement.48 The court thus held 
that the government's interpretation is not inconsistent 
with the INA. At the same time Judge /)ullivan stressed 
that, "although the nexus standard forecloses cases in 
which purely personal disputes are the impetus for the 
persecution, it does not preclude a positive credible 
fear determination simply because there is a personal 
relationship between the persecutor and the victim, so 
long as the one central reason for the persecution is a 
protected ground. "49 
The court then addressed whether the government's 
application of the rule against circularity in the USCIS 
Policy Memo was in compliance with the Refugee 
Act. It held that it was not, as "it ensures that women 
unable to leave their ~elationship will always be 
circular. " 50 This, Sullivan explained , seemed like a 
misinterpretation of that rule as well as "faulty assump-
tions about the analysis in Matter of A-B-" with no 
44 Id. 
45 It/. at 127-28. 
46 Id. at 129. 
47 Id. at 130-31. 
48 Id. at 131. 
49 Id. 
so Id. at 133. 
reasoned explanation for such a changc. 51 Because 
USCIS's interpretation went "well-beyond" what was 
expressed in Matter of A-B- and had no basis in law, the 
court found it lo be arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to 
immigration law. 
The court further held that neither Matter of A-B-
nor the Policy Memo directed officers to exercise 
discretion at credible fear proceedings, but it did find 
tha~ the Policy Memo impennissibly required applicants 
to delineate specific PSGs at that stage in a way that is 
an nrbitrary and capricious interpretation of the law. 52 
It also held that the Policy Memo's direction to USCIS 
officers to ignore relevant circuit law and look at only 
the law of the circuit where the CFI takes place violated 
Brand X,53 a Supreme Court case that established that 
where "an agency is not entitled to deference or if the 
agency's interpretation is unreasonable, a court's prior 
decision interpreting the same statutory provision 
controls. "54 Accordingly, the court found USCIS' direc-
tion to be arbitrary and capricious and in violation of 
the statute.55 
As a result of its findings, the D.C. District Court 
issued a permanent injunction stopping the implemen-
tation of the policies delineated in Matter of A-B- and in 
the USCIS Policy Memo and ordered new interviews 
for the plaintiffs.56 In complying with Grace USCIS 
and EOIR thus issued new guidance for CF proceed-
ings. USCIS directed its officers to evaluate each claim 
on its merits as no general rule for domestic violence 
and gang-related violence exists, to use the "unable 
or unwilling" standard and not the "condoned" or 
"contplcle bciplessness" formulation, to accept that 
PSGs that include "inability to leave" may be cogniz-
able and not circular and no general rule against them 
exists. It directed them not to require applicants to 
delineate or fonnulate PSGs and not to disregard 
contrary circuit law and or limit the analysis to circuit 
law where the applicant is located during the CFI. s7 
Similarly, EOIR pointed out to immigration judges 
conducting credible fear review hearings that they arc 
~1 Id. 
jl Id. at 134-35. 
$l National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. 
Bl'llnd X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
'
4 344 F. Supp. 3d at 137. 
$' Id. at 137-38. 
541 Id. at 146. 
_ 
57 
See USCIS Grace v. Whitaker Guidance, supra 
note I. 
enjoined from applying certain aspects of Matter of 
A-B- and interpretations by USCIS of that case.58 
Grace's Application Beyond the Credible Fear Stage 
Many of the court's conclusions in Grace could be 
applied to asylum claims more generally. Several 
portions of the decision, even those geared primarily 
towards the CFI process, can be persuasive authority 
for asylum applications in other contexts, thanks to 
the court's statutory interpretation and reliance on 
administrative law principles. 
Judge Sullivan reiterated extensively how the 
Refugee Act was enacted in order to bring U.S. law 
into compliance with international law, and that not 
only the Protocol, but also the UNHCR Handbook's 
expansive interpretation of PSGs and of persecution 
can be relied on lo interpret U.S. law in matters of 
asylum. 59 In fact, "the language in the Act should be 
read consistently with the United Nations ' interpretation 
of the refugee standards," and "[t]he clear legislative 
intent to comply with the Protocol and Congress' elec-
tion to not change or add qualifications to the U.N.'s 
definition of 'refugee' demonstrates that Congress 
intended to adopt the U.N. 's interpretation of the word 
'refugee. "' 60 The court also stressed that "the Refugee 
Act was enacted to further the historic policy of the 
United States to respond to the urgent needs of persons 
subject to persecution in their homelands [and] it is the 
policy of the United States to encourage all nations to 
provide assistance and resettlement opportunities to refu-
gees to the fullest extent possible."61 
These statements lend strong support for a more 
' expansive view of how asylum applications should 
be considered, given that international refugee law 
as applied by UNHCR is, in many respects, more 
generous than U.S. asylum law. 62 Reminding the 
government that the Refugee Act was drafted with inter-
national standards of protection in mind, therefore, is an 
58 See EOIR Grace v. Whitaker Guidance, supra note 1. 
59 344 F. Supp. 3d at 123-24. 
60 Id. at 124. 
61 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
62 See e.g., Joan Fitzpatrick, The International Dimen-
sion of U.S. Refugee Law, 15 Berkeley J. lnt'I Law. I, 25 
(1997) ("Even where the international standard is clear and 
peremptory ... , embodied in a ratified treaty, and specifically 
implemented in domestic legislation for the express purpose 
of fulfilling international obligations, both administrators and 
courts resist giving international law its full effect"). 
important success for advancing more progressive 
asylum and refugee law policies domestically that 
reflect those standards. 
Other courts have rightfully relied on UNHCR 
guidelines. 63 The recognition that countries are to 
protect individuals fleeing persecution was an impor-
tant development in human rights law, and the U.S. 
committed itself to providing that protection when it 
signed the Protocol. When the administration enforces 
policies that so clearly go against the spirit of not only 
the Refugee Act but also the Protocol and other inter-
national human rights commitments, such policies 
ought to be challenged because there is a strong basis 
to reject them. 
Another important and far-reaching holding in 
Grace is the court's reminder lo the government that 
it cannot prevent entire groups or categories of appli-
cants from presenting colorable claims for asylum. This 
is true not only at the credible-fear stage, but also during 
asylum interviews or hearings. No such rule can ' exist, 
because it would be contrary to the statute, especially 
when looked at in light of international standards, 
which understand PSGs to be construed broadly. 64 
Moreover, that PSGs have lo be evaluated by adjudica-
tors on a case-by-case basis is a firmly established 
principle, and Grace lends further support for this propa. 
sition and should be used to continue to advance PSGs 
based on domestic-abuse and gang-related violcnce.65 
The court's reliance on the UNHCR Handbook is 
also significant to explain that the term "persecution" is 
clearly defined and was never meant lo require the 
"condone or show complete helplessness'' standard: 
the UNHCR Handbook stated that persecution 
included "serious discriminatory or other offen-
sive acts .. . committed by the local populace ... 
if they are knowingly tolerated by the authori-
ties, or if the authorities refuse, or prove unable, 
to offer effective protection." See UNHCR 
Handbook 165 (emphasis added). It was clear 
63 See, e.g., the seminal Supreme Court opinion in INS v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 n,22 (the UNHCR 
Handbook provides "significant guidance in construing the 
Protocol, to which Congress sought to confonn [and) has 
been widely considered useful in giving content to the obliga-
tions that the protocol establishes.") . 
64 Grace, 344 F. Supp. 3d at 126 ("Credible fear deter-
minations, like requests for asylum in general , must be 
resolved based on the particular facts and circumstances of 
each case."). 
6
' Sec the cases cited supra note 41. 
at the time that the Act was passed by Congress 
that the "unwilling or unable" standard did 
not require a showing that the government 
"condoned" persecution or was "completely 
helpless" to prevent it. "66 
Lastly, the court's statements regarding the rule against 
circularity and the nexus requirement rely on BIA and 
circuit precedents applicable to asylum requests in 
general. 67 
Therefore, while this case was only a challenge to 
credible fear determinations in the expedited removal 
process, the legal conclusions, if upheld, can support 
how future courts limit Matter of A-B-. 
Conclusion 
While Grace is on appeal, the injunction has not 
been, and it signifies a big blow to the sweeping 
statements made by the former Attorney General and 
USCIS. To be sure, even before Grace was decided, 
it was reported that between June 12, 2018, and 
November 30, 2018, there were at least twenty-nine 
grants for domestic violence claims and at least seven-
teen grants for fear-of-gang claims in asylum offices 
across the country, and at least forty-one grants of 
asylum or withholding for domestic violence claims 
and at least thirty-five grants of asylum or withholding 
for fear-of-gang claims at the immigration court level, 
indicating that the view that Matter of A-B- does not 
preclude domestic violence and gang-related claims has 
strong support among adjudicators evcrywherc .68 
Grace thus represents an important tool to push 
back on the restrictions imposed by the government 
on asylum applications for victims of nongovernmental 
persecution. While geared towards credible fear inter-
views and hearings, the decision's language lends itself 
66 344 F. Supp. 3d at 128. 
67 Id. at 13 I, 133 ("courts have routinely found the 
nexus requirement satisfied when a personal relationship 
exists-including cases in which persecutors had a close rela-
tionship with the victim," and "there cannot be a general rule 
when it comes to detennining whether a group is distinct 
because • it is possible that under certain circumstances, the 
society would make such a distinction and consider the shared 
past experience to be a basis for distinction within that 
society."') (citing Mauer of M-E-V-G-, 261. & N. Dec. at 242). 
68 American Immigration Lawyers Association, Matter 
of A-B•: Case Updates, Current Trends, a11d Suggested 
Strategies, AILA Doc. 19020731 (Feb. 2, 2019), available 
al https://www .a.ila.org/infonet/matter.af-a-b-case-updatcs-
currcnt-trcnds, https://pennacc/K2TK-F5RP. 
to being used at all levels of asylum proceedings more 
generally. Between its strong reliance on international 
standards and its reiteration that no blanket rule can be 
established to prevent applications involving privately 
sponsored violence from being granted, Grace will be a 
powerful instrument for advocates to advance their 
clients' cases and for adjudicators lo address them 
fairly. Of equal importance is the decision's signal to 
the current administration that the government may not 
deviate from long-standing precedents and the existing 
law without facing the courts' exacting scrutiny. No 
matter how badly the administration wants to curtail 
protections for noncitizens on all fronts, there arc laws 
in place and a judicial system that will not tolerate 
arbitrary and unsupported applications ofunfair policies 
against vulnerable groups. 
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